New Zealand's elimination strategy for the Covid-19 pandemic: early success but uncertainties and risks remain

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Outline

- Strategic choices for countries
- Control, elimination, eradication
- Components of elimination strategy
 - Exclusion
 - Reducing transmission
 - Case and outbreak management
- Pandemic characteristics & effect of lockdown
- Additional actions to maintain elimination
- Uncertainties and Research questions
- Implications and generalisability




Strategic choices by countries

Factors influencing choices of approaches, including:

- Health impact, particularly CFR, IFR
- Transmissibility, notably Ro
- Controllability, ability to exclude, eliminate, manage
- Inequalities
- Certainty of information
- Science capacity
- Awareness of options, counterfactuals, experience, dogma



Mortality rates for Māori vs non-Māori in 3 successive influenza pandemics



Source: Wilson et al 2012, Emerg Infect Dis




Strategic choices by countries

Pandemic influenza plan

- Essentially a mitigation approach
- NZ had its first COVID-19 case on 28 Feb
- Local transmission by early March
- Reached 100 cases on 20 March

Ministry of Health. 2017. New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan: A framework for action (2nd edn). Wellington: Ministry of Health.

Figure 1: New Zealand strategic approach to a pandemic



Control, elimination, eradication

Disease management options:

- Control Reduce disease incidence to acceptable levels
- Elimination Disease absence from a country or region
- Eradication Global absence of infection





What is elimination

Definition of elimination

- Absence of detected cases for a defined period eg, 28 days*
- Presence of a high performing surveillance system
- With defined exclusions eg, cases identified at borders and placed in effective isolation/quarantine

*Usually specified according to statistical likelihood eg 95% probability of elimination. Distinct from active cases.




Source: Wilson et al

Distinguishing features of Elimination

Component of pandemic control system	Feature of elimination vs. mitigation and suppression
Border management, including exclusion, quarantine	Increased intensity as critical to creating and sustaining elimination
Case, contact and outbreak management , including case isolation and contact tracing and quarantine, with digital assistance	Increased intensity as critical to creating and sustaining elimination
Disease surveillance, including high volume testing and sentinel surveillance	Increased intensity as critical to creating and sustaining elimination, including strong emphasis on rapid, sensitive case identification and additional methods to confirm elimination
Physical distancing and movement restriction at various levels (up to lockdown)	Ability to introduce early and intensely to suppress community transmissions and outbreaks
Public communication to improve hand washing, cough etiquette, mask wearing, physical distancing	Probably no change, but will need to be increased if 'lockdown' is required (under any scenarios)
Coordination and logistics	Potentially increased to manage intense elimination measures
Protecting vulnerable populations	Similar, but duration will be shorter if elimination is successful
Health system capacity eg expansion of ICU and ventilator capacity	Similar, but duration will be shorter and demand less intense if elimination is successful
Protecting healthcare workers	No change
Research and evaluation	Potentially increased given limited evidence base for elimination measures

Strategic choices for countries



*Control interventions: (1) Border controls to 'keep it out'; (2) Case isolation & contact quarantine to 'stamp it out'; (3) Improved hygiene and use of masks; (4) Physical distancing; (5) Movement restrictions; (6) Combinations including 'lock-down'

NB. There are multiple other interventions to mitigate harm, focussed on health services & protecting vulnerable




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New Zealand's COVID-19 Response: Go hard, go early

All of Government COVID-19 Strategy and Policy, 15 May 2020



Components of elimination strategy

1. Exclusion of cases

• *Keep it out* – Border Management

2. Reducing transmission

- Reducing transmission per contact Hygiene measures, Masks
- Reducing contacts Physical distancing & Travel restrictions

3. Case and outbreak management

• *Stamp it out* – Testing, contact tracing, isolation



Exclusion – Border Management

Key components:

- Entry restrictions (near closure)
- Self-isolation
- Supervised isolation and Managed quarantine
- Practices with aircrew and seaports

Key dates:

- 2 Feb Entry restrictions & self isolation
- 14 March Cruise ships banned
- 19 March NZ borders closed to all except NZ citizens
- 9 April Quarantine/managed isolation






Wellington Airport, Wikicommons



Reducing transmission

Intervention logic for pandemic response strategies



The logic: Stopping the pandemic means reducing the reproduction number (R) to less than 1. The 3 drivers are transmission, contact rate, and duration of infectivity.

Kvalsvig 2020

Reducing transmission – Alert levels

New Zealand COVID-19 Alert Levels Summary

Unite against COVID-19

- The Alert Levels are determined by the Government and specify the public health and social measures to be taken in the fight against COVID-19. Further guidance is available on the Covid19.govt.nz website.
- The measures may be updated based on new scientific knowledge about COVID-19, information about the
 effectiveness of control measures in New Zealand and overseas, or the application of Alert Levels at different
 times (e.g. the application may be different depending on if New Zealand is moving down or up Alert Levels).

ELIMINATION STRATEGY - New Zealand is working together to eliminate COVID-19.

Different parts of the country may be at different Alert Levels. We can move up and down Alert Levels.

- Essential services including supermarkets, health services, emergency services, utilities and goods transport will
 continue to operate at any level. Employers in those sectors must continue to meet health and safety obligations.
- Restrictions are cumulative (e.g. at Alert Level 4, all restrictions from Alert Levels1, 2 and 3 apply).

Published 25 May 2020

Alert Level	RiskAssessment	Range of Measures (can be applied locally crnationally)	
Level 4 – Lockdown Likely the disease is not contained	Communitytransmission is occurring. Wides pread o utbreaks and new clusters.	 People instructed to stay at home in their bubble other than for essential personal movement. Safe recreational activity is allowed in local area. Travel is severely limited. All gatherings cancelled and all public venues closed. 	 Business es closed except foressentialservices (e.g. supermarkets, pharmacies, clirics, petrol stations) and lifeline utilities. Educational facilities closed. Rationing of supplies and requisitioning of facilities possible. Reprioritisation of healthcare services.
Level 3 – Restrict High risk the disease is not contained	 Communitytransmission might be happ ening. New clusters may emerge but can be controlled through tosting and contact tracing. 	 People instructed to stayhome in their bubble other than for easertial personalmovement – including to go to work, school if they have to, or for local recreation. Physical distancing of two metres outside home (including on public transport), or one metre in controlled environments like schools and work pisces. People must say within their immediatehousehold bubble, but can expand this to recomment with close family / whinau, or orbing in carriegivers, or support is dated people. This extended bubble should remain exclusive. Schools (years ito 10) and Early Childhood Education centres cans afelyopen, but with exert from home unless that is not possible. People must work from home unless that is not possible. Business es can open premises, but cannot physically interact with customers. 	 Low risk local recreation activities are allowed. Public venues are closed (e.g. libraries, museums, cinemas, food courts, gyms, pools, playgrounds, markets). Gathering of top to 10 people are allowed but only for wedding services, funerals and tangihanga. Physical distancing and public health measures mus the maintained. Healthcare services use virtual, non-contact core ultations where possible. Inter-regional ravel is highly limited (e.g. for essential workers, with limited exemptions for others). People at high risk of severe liness (older people and those with existing madical conditional precautions when leaving home. They may choose to work.
Level 2 – Reduce The disease is contained, but the risk of community transmission remains	 Household transmission could be occurring. Single or is olated cluster outbreaks. 	 Paople can reconnect with friends and family, and socialise in groups of up to 100, go shopping, or travel domestically, if following public health guidance. Kaep physical distancing of two metres from paople you don't know when out in public or in retail stores. Keep onemetre physical distancing in controlled environments like workplaces, where practicable. Nomore than 100 people at gatherings, including weddings, birthdays and funerals and tang harga. Business et can open to the public if following public health guidance including physical distancing and record keeping. Alternative ways of working are encoursed where possible. Hos pitality businesses must keep groups of customers separated, seated, and served by a single persion. Maximum of 100 people at atime. 	 Sport and recreation activities are allowed, subject to conditions on gatherings, record keeping, and – where practical – physical distancing. Public varues such as museums, libraries and pools can open if they comply with public health measures and ensure 1 metre physical distancing and record keeping. Event facilities, including chemas, stadiums, concert venues and cas nos can have more than 100 people at a time, provided that there are no more than 100 in adefined space, and thegroups do not mix. Health and disability care services operate as normally as possible. It is safe to s and your children to schools, early learningservices and tertiary education. There will be appropriate measures in place. Poople at higher-risk of severelliness from COV ID-19 (e.g. those with underlying medical conditions, specially if not well-commoled, and seniors) are encouraged to take additional precautions when leaving thoma. They may work, if they agree with their employer that they can do so safely.
Level 1 – Prepare The disease is contained in New Zealand	 COVID-19 is uncontrolled oversees. Isolated ho usehold transmission could be occurring in New Zealand. 	 Border ertrymeasures to minimise risk of importing COVID-19 cases. Intensive tas Singfor COVID-19. Rapid contact tracing of any positive case. Self-is claston and quarantine required. Schools and workplaces open, and must operate safely. Physical distancing encouraged. 	No restrictions on gatherings. Stay homeil' you've sick, report flu-like symptoms. Was hand dry hands, cough into elbow, don'ttouch your face. No restrictions on domestic transport –avoid public transport ortravel if sick.

Physical distancing

Key components

- Closure of schools, workplaces
- Stay at home in 'bubble' at level 4
- Physical distancing 2 metres
- Limited travel
- **But**, no promotion of mass masking (=wearing of mainly reusable fabric face masks by public)

Key dates

- Level 4 26 March
- Level 3 28 April
- Level 2 14 May





Social distancing, Alert Level 3, May 2020



Reducing transmission per contact

Key components

- Physical distancing
- Stay at home if sick
- Handwashing
- Cough etiquette
- Infection control in healthcare settings
- **But**, no promotion of mass masking (=wearing of mainly reusable fabric face masks by public)





Source: Pexel



Case and contact management

Key components:

- Establish & increase testing capacity
- Contact tracing
- Case and contact isolation
- **But**, limited digital assistance with contact tracing **Key dates**
- 2 Feb Diagnostic test for COVID-19 available
- 18 March 1,000+ tests per day
- 24 March National Close Contact Service created






Swabbing for Covid-19, Wellington, May 2020



Pandemic: Source of cases






Geographic distribution of COVID-19 cases

Northland 28 237 Waitematā Auckland 178 Counties Manukau 131 47 Bay of Plenty Waikato 188 4 Tairāwhiti 16 Lakes Taranaki 16 44 Hawke's Bay Whanganui 9 32 MidCentral 20 Hutt Valley 95 Capital & Coast Wairarapa 8 5 West Coast 49 Nelson Marlborough 164 Canterbury includes Chatham Islands 17 South Canterbury 216 Southern 1,504 TOTAL

Age distribution of COVID-19 cases





Transmission type of COVID-19 cases


Transmission type	% of cases
Imported cases	38%
Imported related cases	31%
Locally acquired cases, epidemiologically linked	25%
Locally acquired cases, unknown source	6%
Source under investigation	0%

Source: ESR EpiSurv extract as at 09:00 11 June 2020

Impact of Alert Levels / Lockdowns


Simulated and actual daily numbers of new local and imported cases (confirmed and probable) . Effective reproduction number Reff

- Prior to lockdown: Reff = 1.8 (best-fit to case data) prior to lockdown
- Level 4 Reff = 0.35 (best-fit)
- Level 3 Reff = 0.95 (assumed)
- Level 2 Reff = 1.7 (assumed)



Source: Shaun Hendy et al

Impact of Alert Levels / Lockdowns



Source: Alexei Drummond , Jordan Douglas, et al. Centre for Computational Evolution, University of Auckland, New Zealand

rplan bla You'll find both 'Our plan - the four Alert Levels' and 'Your plan - for staying so you and your family, whānau or flatmates are familiar with them. The Alert Levels are precautionary measures, designed to hold iot symptoms? Call your GP first, or Healthy

Flyer delivered to all NZ households, March 2020



Future threats for NZ

Pandemic threats

- Border management
- Increased coronavirus transmission in winter
- Resuming large indoor social gatherings

Effects of pandemic response

- Economic hardship
- Increased inequalities socioeconomic and ethnic
- Multiple global health threats



Additional actions to maintain elimination

- Continue careful border management
- Establish a culture of face mask use as part of multibarrier approach to risk management
- Enhance contact tracing with digital tools eg, Bluetooth enabled card/device
- Rapid review of NZ response & establishment of dedicated national public health agency, plus thorough commission of inquiry



Uncertainties and Research questions

- Global pandemic control vaccines +/- antivirals
- Effectiveness and duration of immunity
- Optimal mix of strategies for managing outbreaks and achieving elimination face masks, contact tracing
- Managing risk of travel



Strengths and weaknesses of NZ response

Strengths

- Good science, good leadership, decisive action
- Chief science advisors, accessible decision-makers
- Effective strategic advice from epidemiologists
- High public trust and engagement

Weaknesses

- Eroded, fragmented and underfunded public health infrastructure
- Resistance to change eg, face mask policy



Net effects on disease burden

High-income jurisdiction	Death Numbers	Deaths per million population from COVID-19 (22 May))
Elimination / containment		
Australia (lowest in OECD with NZ)	103	4
New Zealand (lowest in OECD with Australia)	21	4
Singapore	23	4
Hong Kong (China)	4	0.5
Taiwan	7	0.4
Fiji (18 cases)	0	0
Samoa, Tonga	0	0
Selected jurisdictions in the OECD		
Belgium (highest in OECD)	9,364	808
United Kingdom (highest Anglophone nation in OECD)	37,048	536
New York		1,500
United States – 100,000 deaths	100,000	304
But NY rate applied to US pop of 328 million -> 0.5 million		
Mitigation – herd immunity		
Sweden	3,412	409
Denmark	563	97
Norway	235	43
Finland	312	56
Other countries		
Brazil	24,593	116
Iran	7,508	90

Summary/Main points

- Risk assessment and effective strategic decision making is important in public health crises
- Requires effective science and leadership
- Need to strengthen public health infrastructure for this and future crises
- Need to strengthen and reform global health agencies like WHO
- Benefits of sharing approaches such as elimination/containment internationally
- Opportunity for broad 'reset' and an increased focus on managing major global health threats

